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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Richard W. Cooper*
The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act was the subject of an interest-
ing opinion in the case of English v. Matowitz, Chief of Police, et al .,.
Ohio ... ; 72 N. E. (2d) 898, (1947). Petitioner, seeking a writ of
habeas corpus, had been arrested in Ohio upon a warrant of extradition
issued by requisition of the Governor of Pennsylvania. He was charged
with the crime of "accessory before the fact to robbery, and robbery"
and alleged to be a "fugitive from justice." The extent of petitioner's
participation in the crime was the lending of a deadly weapon to the
actual perpetrator with knowledge of its intended use. The robbery
was committed in Pennsylvania but petitioner at no time left Ohio.
The Supreme Court of Ohio supported petitioner's contention that
since he did not flee from Pennsylvania he was not a "fugitive fromjustice," and therefore was not subject to extradition under the pro-
visions of Section 2, Article IV of the Federal Constitution, or the
supplemental federal law, 18 U. S. C. A. 662. But the court adopted
the respondent's claim that Section 109-6, General Code, generally
known as "the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act," governed the case
and held that even though petitioner was not a "fugitive from justice"
he could be extradited under it. To the petitioner's charge that the
statute was unconstitutional the court pointed out that neither the Con-
stitution nor the federal enactments even impliedly covered the situ-
ation in the instant case. The Uniform Act is merely supplementary to
the federal laws. The statute is as follows:
"The governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of
the executive authority of any other state, any person in this state
charged in such other state in the manner provided in section 3
(General Code § 109-3) with committing an act in this state, or
in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state
whose executive authority is making the demand, and the provisions
of this act not otherwise inconsistent, shall apply to such cases, even
though the accused was not in that stafe at the time of the commis-
sion of the crime, and has not fled therefrom."
Thirty-one states, including Pennsylvania, have adopted the statute.
(See 8 Ohio State L. Jour., 255, 256 (1942).
Evidence Obtained by Unreasonable Search of Automobile-The case
of Robertson et al. v. State, ... Tenn...., 198 S. W. (2d) 633 (1947),
involves the power of arrest and inspection by the State Highway Patrol
and abuse of that power. Two Tennessee patrolmen noticed defendant's
car ahead of them and their attention was particularly attracted when
a passenger kept staring through the rear window at them. They
checked their list of stolen cars but none of the descriptions applied
to the car they were following. Finally they stopped the car, on sus-
picion, and checked the driver's operator's license. The license was in
proper order but, while the patrolmen were standing by the car, they
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saw a carton of whiskey behind the seat. The defendants were tried
and convicted for unlawfully transporting alcoholic beverages. On
appeal defendants claimed the court below erred in admitting the patrol-
men's testimony in evidence on the ground that it was obtained by an
illegal search and seizure. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed
the case in favor of the defendants. The court emphasized that by
statute a warrant for arrest and for search and seizure is required and
that since highway patrolmen are excepted from this rule, in-so-far as
they may stop any car and demand to see the license of the operator,
their unusual power should be strictly construed and made to stay
within its proper bounds. The authority is solely of statutory origin
and is sanctioned by revenue necessities and the protection of the public
against reckless or unqualified drivers. But here the court was of the
opinion that the right was used as a pretext for an inspection of the
contents of the automobile. Such a "fishing expedition" conducted by
state patrolmen was considered as a clear violation of their limited
authority and evidence obtained in this manner cannot be made the
basis of a conviction. (For a case note on the right to search an auto-
mobile see 22 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 284; and for recent comment
on the "Recent United States Supreme Court Interpretations of the
Law of Searches and Seizures," 37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 413.)
Mann Act Extended to Outlaw Transportation of Plural Wives Across
State Lines by Members of Religious Sect Practicing Polygamy-In Cleve-
land et al. v. U. S., ... U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 13 (1946), the United States
Supreme Court, in effect, reaffirmed the controversial result of Gamin-
etti v. U. S., 242 U. S. 470; 37 S. Ct. 192 (1917), by holding that the
scope of the Mann, or White Slave Traffic Act, is not restricted to com-
mercialized vice, and that the practice of polygomy is even a worse
influence in society than the isolated immoral practice involved in the
Caminetti case.
The Act makes a felony the transportation in interstate commerce
of "any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery,
or for any other immoral purpose." (Mann Act . 2, 18 U. S. C. A.
. 398). The decision is couched in the phrase "for any other immoral
purpose" as was the Caminetti case.
Defendant argued, (1) that polygamy was a form of marriage and
could not be classified with prostitution or debauchery; (2) that the
legislative history (H. R., Rep. No. 47, 61st Cong. 2nd Sess., Ser. No. 886
(1910), 9-10) contained no indication that the act was aimed at polyg-
amy; (3) that interstate transportation did not further the defendant's
purposes. The Court rejected these pleas and concluded with the warn-
ifg that if such practice were upheld it would place beyond the law any
act done under claim of religious belief. Three justices, in a vigorous
dissent, supported the defendant's contentions, and one justice, in a con-
curring opinion, stated. that although the earlier Caminetti decision
was still the law it really extended the coverage of the Mylann Act beyond
the Congressional intent and purpose. (See 56 Yale L. J. 720 for a com-
plete account of this line of cases.)
The Weight to Be Given to the Testimony of Police Officers in Murder
Trial-The defendant was convicted of first degree murder. One specifi-
cation, of error, on appeal, was the trial court's refusal to give the
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following instruction: "The court instructs the jury that certain police.
state and county officers have testified in this case on behalf of the
state, and that, in weighing their testimony greater care should be used,
because of the natural and unavoidable tendency of such persons in
procuring and stating evidence against the defendant." The Supreme
Court of North Dakota, although it reversed the case and ordered a
new trial on other grounds, held the trial judge properly refused the
instruction since (1) there was no prejudice or bias shown, (2) the only
ground for the request was the official positions held by these wit-
nesses, (3) none of them were spedial investigators in the case, (4) the
officers' duty was as much to protect the innocent as to apprehend and
convict the guilty and they are presumed to have acted in furtherance
of their duty. State v. Maresch, ... N. D. ... ; 27 N. W. 2nd 1 (1947).
Pre-Arraignment Confessions, Later Used in Juvenile Court, Held
Admissible in Subsequent Proceedings-In State v. Lowder, ... Ohio
App. ... ; 72 N. E. 2nd 785 (1946), three minors were arrested as
murder suspects, and signed confessions were obtained from each of
them before any charges were filed. The confessions were used in
Juvenile Court, from which the case was referred to the Common Pleas
Court. There the defendants were indicted, tried and convicted. Two
questions as to the admissibility of the confessions presented themselves
on appeal: (1) Were they admissible even though the accused were
not taken immediately before the Juvenile Court as directed by Sec-
tion 1639-27 General Code?; (2) Did the fact that they were used in
Juvenile Court render them inadmissible, under Section 1639-30 General
Code, in further proceedings?
The question of confessions obtained before arraignment, especially
when detention by the police is prolonged, has troubled not only the
trial and appellate courts of the country but also the Supreme Court
of the United States. (See 36 J. Criminal L. & Criminology, 222.)
The Ohio Court of Appeals in the instant case made no attempt to
reconcile the federal decisions and chose State v. Collett, 58 N. E. (2d)
417, and People v. Alex, 265 N. Y. 192, 192 N. B. 289, 94 A. L. R. 1033,
as governing precedents. The length of time before arraignment was
not revealed by the facts but the court, after reviewing the evidence,
found the confessions to have been voluntarily made and therefore
admissible.
The second question was answered in the negative and Section 1639-
30, General Code, was held inapplicable to the present situation. The
section, which is a portion of the Juvenile Court Code, provides in part:
"The disposition of a child under the judgment rendered or any evi-
dence given in the court shall not be admissible as evidence against the
child in any other case or proceeding in any other court." (Italics
supplied.) The court held that since no judgment had been rendered
by the Juvenile Court and the case was referred to Common Pleas
through the normal procedural channel, it was still the same case and
the same proceeding and not "any other case or proceeding in any other
court. "
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